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1. INTRODUCTION 
An "environmental" perspective on multilateral development 
bank (MDB) loans presents at least three points of analysis relevant 
to Third World development issues. First, it gives some very vivid 
and instructive examples of how the international development loan 
process can go askew. Second, it demonstrates practically why and 
how the lending process itself has required constructive reform. 
Third, in reviewing legal approaches to reform, including recent 
pressures on MDBs, it helps clarify a latent debate about the legit-
imacy of donor-nation pressure on international lending institu-
tions. 
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This article focuses upon World Bank projects and processes, 
not only because they provide many useful examples of disastrous 
development loans, but also because in the past two years the World 
Bank, followed by other regional MDBs, has made a dramatic of-
ficial shift in its willingness to recognize the seriousness of environ-
mental problems caused by MDB projects. The new statements of 
policy and procedure are an attempt to reform the development 
loan process by making it more rational and less prone to environ-
mental disaster, an initiative that so far seems to be winning mixed 
reviews.' 
The particular example of World Bank loans for the construc-
tion of large capital intensive dam projects is quite useful. 2 Dam 
construction offers one discrete sector of development assistance 
that can be viewed on its own terms. It is an area in which major 
problems have surfaced over the years in World Bank and other 
MDB projects. It is also an area in which the banks have encoun-
tered vociferous opposition from a very effective coalition of West-
ern and Third World environmental non-governmental organiza-
tions (NGOs). Dam-building offers useful opportunities to examine 
how engineering and financing decisions can go astray, while also 
1 See the brief analysis of the evolution of environmental planning considerations in 
World Bank development loans, infra text accompanying note 51. 
2 The text of this article, because it is derived from a speech format, is not extensively 
footnoted. For background data and further information on international dambuilding 
projects, see generally: Environmental Performance of the Multilateral Development Banks: Hearings 
before the Subcommittee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Committee 
on Banking, Finance, and Urban Affairs, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 Hear-
ings] (particularly submissions of Bruce Rich, Esq., on behalf of the Environmental Defense 
Fund); Aufderheide and Rich, Environmental Reform and the Multilateral Banks, Spring 1988 
WORLD POLICY j. 301 (1988); Rich, Funding Deforestation: Conservation Woes at the World Bank, 
THE NATION (Jan. 1989); Rich, The Multilateral Development Banks, Environmental Policy, and 
the United States, 12 EcoL. L.Q. 681 (1985) [hereinafter Development Banks]; Address by Barber 
B. Conable, President of the World Bank, World Resources Institute, Washington, D.C. (May 
5, 1987) (available from World Bank); Groups Call for Action to Block World Bank Loan, 18 NOT 
MAN APART 7 (1988) [hereinafter World Bank Loan]; INTERNATIONAL DAMS NEWSLETTER 
(Winter 1985, and all subsequent issues) (available through Environmental Policy Center and 
Earth Island Institute); Rabben, Brazil on the Brink - Land, Debt, and Democracy, THE NATION, 
Apr. 30, 1988, at 597; Castanheira, Balbina Goes on Line, 2 EARTH ISLAND j., 38 (1987); 
Williams, Damming the World, 13 NOT MAN APART, Oct. 1983, at 10; THE WORLD BANK, 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT (1984); BUND FUR UMWELT UND NATURSCHUTZ, ET. AL., 
FINANCING ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION (1987) [hereinafter ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION] (avail-
able from U.S. Environmental Defense Fund); Colchester, Hydropower Projects in Central India, 
in AN END TO LAUGHTER (1985); GESELLSCHAFT FUR BEDROHTE VOLKER, ACTION FOR THREAT-
ENED PEOPLES: INDIA (1984) [hereinafter THREATENED PEOPLES]; Muldoon, The International 
Law of Ecodevelopment: Emerging Norms for Development Assistance Agencies, 22 TEX. INT'L L.j. 
1(1987). 
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offering a limited opportunity to applaud the Bank's recent devel-
opment reform efforts. 
This article is organized in three parts. The first part offers a 
brief introduction to the environmental perspective, and then sets 
out a spectrum of serious environmental diseconomies which have 
been caused by various international dam projects, an accounting 
that requires the analytical observer to go beyond the usual broad 
and imprecise rubric of "social costs" or "economic externalities." 
The second section of the article focuses on MDB administrative 
process: why have problems occurred over the years in the imple-
mentation of international development projects, and how can de-
cisions be improved? The final section analyzes a range of available 
legal approaches for modifying and improving the international 
development loan processes, focusing on the practical example of 
several recent cases of donor-nation pressure on the MDBs. From 
an observer's perspective, the most noteworthy recent improve-
ments in the development loan process are quite clearly attributable 
to external pressures applied to MDBs by major donor-countries-
a development that may well worry some internationalists. 
II. THE ENVIRONMENTAL PERSPECTIVE AND ENVIRONMENTAL 
DISECONOMIES IN INTERNATIONAL DAM PROJECTS 
A. Environmentalism 
Two very contrary images will help the reader understand the 
particular perspective of environmental analysts and activists in 
their role on the world stage. The first image is the broadly held 
caricature of environmentalists, particularly common amongst those 
in the development profession. Most environmentalists are, in the 
eyes of many such promoters, a small but noisy elite, inexpert, 
primitive, petulant, opinionated amateurs, unfounded and insub-
stantial in their analysis, but unfortunately all too clever at mobiliz-
ing the media in quixotic campaigns to protect some endangered 
flower, fish, or dickey bird.3 Environmentalists cannot see the forest 
for the trees; they are skewed in their vision and their values. In 
their criticism of MDB lending, they are just being "Bank-bashers." 
3 See Tennessee Valley Authority v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153 (1978); Plater, Reflections in a River: 
Agency Accountability and T.V.A.'s Tellico Dam Project, 49 TENN. L. REV. 747 (1982); Plater, In 
the Wake of the Snail Darter, 19 J.L. REFORM 4 (1986). 
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The other quite contrary perspective is environmentalists' view 
of themselves. On one hand, those who work in environmental 
initiatives know there is as much ecological diversity within the ranks 
of those who call themselves "environmentalists" as there is in a 
hectare of tropical rainforest, ranging from scattered cells of bright-
eyed nihilists in eco-guerilla "direct actions," to polite associations 
of silk-stocking, East Coast Brahmin noblesse oblige conservationists; 
from lonely guardians of a particular bog or forest, to advocacy 
organizations based in New York or Washington with thousands of 
members, dealing with dozens of issues around the country and the 
world. There are environmental groups dedicated to calm, rigorous 
scientific research, others emphasizing legal interventions, economic 
analysis, sociological issues, or artistic, historical, or quasi-religious 
values; some are deeply involved in political lobbying, and others 
adamantly avoid political entanglement; some are characterized by 
establishment sobriety, others by the fervors of campmeeting po-
pulism. 
The United States has developed the most substantial and di-
verse environmental community, but in recent years the U.S. ex-
ample has been followed by a plethora of similarly diverse organi-
zations in Western Europe, elsewhere in the developed world, and 
in a growing number of Third World nations and localities. The 
distinctions between different groups within the environmental 
spectrum may often be greater than between a particular environ-
mental organization and its non-environmental adversaries. The 
environmental coalition that has recently been applying reform 
pressures on the MDBs for instance, as we will see, has generally 
been characterized by its groups' professionalism, careful fact-find-
ing, rigorous economic and legal analysis, and subtle political savvy.4 
On the other hand, there is a common thread that runs through 
virtually all the diversity of the environmental "movement," a con-
cern with values and ecological interconnectedness that has practical 
as well as philosophical coherence. My environmental law students 
once were visited by David Brower, one of the more eminent en-
vironmental activists in the U.S. today, who enjoyed the title role in 
the book, Encounters With the Archdruid. 5 Standing tall in front of the 
4 This coalition was led by several U.S. groups, notably the Environmental Defense Fund, 
Environmental Policy Center, Natural Resources Defense Council, National Wildlife Feder-
ation, Sierra Club, and Rainforest Action Network, joined by Probe International (Canada), 
Friends of the Earth and Survival International (Great Britain), Rainforest Information 
(W. Germany), and Third World organizations. 
5 J. McPHEE, ENCOUNTERS WITH THE ARCH DRUID (1971). 
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students, white-haired and raw-boned with piercing blue eyes, 
Brower stretched out his arm, with thumb and forefinger held about 
two inches apart and said to them: 
Imagine if you will our entire planet reduced to this, the size 
of an egg .... A computer ecologist did some interesting com-
putations for me: if the planet Earth were reduced to the size 
of an egg, what do you think its total mass of air, of atmosphere, 
would be? And what would be the total mass of the water that, 
along with air and sunlight, sustains life on this Earth? 
Based on those computations the sum total of atmosphere 
veiled around this egg planet Earth would be equivalent to no 
more than the volume of a large pea wrapped around the globe! 
And the water? That would be no more than the mass of a large 
matchhead, a tiny volume spread thin, just enough to fill the 
oceans, rivers and lakes of the world. 
Looking at the students, Brower asked, "Thinking of those limits, 
can you any longer not believe that our planet is a tremendously 
vulnerable little system, totally dependent on this fragile tissue of 
air and water, a thin fabric of life support made up of all the air 
and water the Earth will ever have?" 
Brower's egg illustrates environmentalists' shared perspective 
on environmentalism - an ultimately utilitarian approach in pla-
netary, if not project terms, based upon an attempt to make a 
rational accounting of all of the real long term residual costs of 
modern technology including consideration of economically intan-
gible as well as tangible values, in a context of limited and fragile 
resources. It is an approach characterized by a consistent skepticism 
about projects that do not reflect overall economic and ecological 
accounting.6 
6 Although development interests here and abroad often chafe at environmentalists' 
"meddling," and seek to characterize it as a narrow, unrealistic, aesthetic initiative, the record 
reviewed here shows that the engineers, the people who fund them, and the nations that 
desperately need improvements in their conditions, often need the cold dose of reality 
represented by "environmental" queries in planning successful development. In some cases 
this will result in scrapping large-ticket capital-intensive projects. It is a thesis of this article 
that rational systems require that there be someone included in the process whose role will 
be to check whether the emperor really is wearing clothes. Absent such an effective com-
ponent in the MDB process, this is often the self-appointed role of the environmental analyst. 
Environmentalism thus is not viewed by its advocates as a rarified aesthetic concept or 
as a minor luxury, when weighed against pressing human needs for development. Most 
environmental issues fought over today are based on the activists' insistence on an overall 
long term accounting of real benefits, costs, and alternatives, seeking to make administrative 
decisions truly rational in terms of human utility. In practice, this usually means that envi-
ronmental groups try to include various ignored real costs (in terms of longer range conse-
quences and "intangible" unaccounted values destroyed or foregone) into the development 
accounting in order to achieve overall rationality. 
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From both perspectives, in the view of the development profes-
sion and in their own eyes, environmentalists often appear to be 
like little limpets clinging to the coattails of the engineers and fin-
anciers who day in and day out decide what will be done. In the 
eyes of developers, environmentalists latch on to these issues in 
order to harass them. From the environmentalists' own perspective, 
it is to help. In either event, both perspectives recognize that envi-
ronmentalists usually remain outsiders to the decision-making pro-
cess. 
Environmentalists nevertheless do pose important questions. 
Environmental accounting on large dam projects in the Third 
World is a case in point, illustrating the MDB process and its prob-
lems, and a functional role for environmentalism. 
B. Environmental Diseconomies in International Dam Projects 
There have been many problems with large dam development 
loans over the years, some well known and some not so well known. 
Even without adopting a North/South debt-enslavement conspiracy 
theory, it is possible to discern projects that have not necessarily 
improved the developing nations' overall economic positions, where 
the institutional structure and momentum of the MDB lending 
process not only failed to prevent but indeed created, fostered, and 
encouraged diseconomic programs and projects. 
Most well-read individuals today have a vague notion that large 
dam projects have indeed produced some unanticipated problems 
over the years. The Aswan Dam is the most familiar, a development 
project that brought schistosomiasis outbreaks and severely-altered 
river flows, and destroyed one of the world's most productive ag-
ricultural zones, in the Nile Valley and its delta region. 7 
Environmental problems, however, occur in a remarkably large 
number of different categories of residual effects, which for our 
purposes should not merely be lumped into the minimizing rubric 
of "social costs" or "external costs" as economists often want to do. 
Those terms tend to insulate or depreciate the overall dimensions 
of direct costs imposed by various projects, and, even more impre-
cisely, imply that at least within the "internal" terms of the particular 
development project itself there is accurate accounting of potential 
costs. Rational analysis is better served by dividing the different 
7 See generally Hanlon, Environmental Chaos in Mega Projects: Can it be Cured? (1986) 
(unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
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categories of environmental diseconomies into three different 
classes: Class I would include system effects like the loss of an 
endangered species, an effect not generally tangible in national or 
local economic terms, but affecting human and ecological values, 
aesthetics, or planetary health. Class I diseconomies thus are less 
likely to receive consideration based on developmental pragmatics; 
instead they require protective initiatives based on altruistic prin-
ciples. Class II effects are like the Aswan Dam's spreading of schis-
tosomiasis, offsite problems directly caused by a project, that are 
economically tangible in national or local terms although often not 
considered in MDB project accounting before or after the fact. Class 
III diseconomies are mistakes like building nuclear plants on earth-
quake faults, problems caused for the project by the project itself, 
which undercut the specific purpose and function of the project 
and thus should have been accountable in project planners' own 
terms of direct project self-interest. Class III effects demonstrate 
why it is wrong to regard environmental costs as "external" costs. 
Large dams cause diseconomies in all three classes of project 
effects. 
1. Project Benefits 
Usually, though not always, the engineers and planners who 
design dam-oriented development projects are quite accurate in 
their most obvious and direct project calculations. The annual vol-
ume and flow of a river can be determined quite precisely, as can 
the exact dimensions, the height from the bedrock base of the dam 
to the top of the spillway, creating a power head that will usually 
produce, at least in the short term, the projected capacity of elec-
trical generation, or the projected volume of diverted irrigation 
flows. In brief, whatever direct benefits the structure will mechan-
ically produce are likely to be more or less accurately estimated in 
the project designing and funding process.8 
8 Project planning accuracy, however, is not always achieved. See infra, text following 
note 25. It is not the purpose of this article to present detailed benefit-cost studies of projects. 
Increasingly, this job is being undertaken in the resource economics profession outside the 
MDBs. See, e.g., Rogers, Planning Without Facts: A Framework for Economic Evaluation of 
the Three Gorges Project (November 1986) (unpublished manuscript on file with author) 
presented at Symposium of the Education and Science Society (Dec. 6, 1986). 
The fundamental point is, however, that some past projects have not only experienced 
environmental diseconomies, but indeed have been so devoid of benefits that the entire 
projects can be seen as mistakes. Like the Balbina dam in Brazil completed with World Bank 
financing, which even official observers now admit to be "a disaster," the millions of dollars 
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2. Project Costs 
But the estimated costs of a project are rationally as important 
as the benefits, and a project's costs typically are not fully accounted 
for in the MDB's price tag for it,9 even including the chronic over-
runs that seem to be inevitable in such projects once underway. The 
following catalog of environmental costs is not likely to be repre-
sented in full in anyone dam project, but all of the listed disecon-
omies have occurred in past projects, including World Bank fi-
nanced projects. It is far more likely that many of these costs will 
be found cumulated in any Third World dam project than that 
none will be found. The sad fact is that virtually all Third World 
international development dam projects to date have suffered from 
a dysfunctionally constrained scope of review that fails to consider 
serious direct and indirect environmental diseconomies. 
With recent efforts by the World Bank and other regional 
MDBs to effect radical improvements in their decision-making pro-
cesses, the following list may, one hopes, become a checklist of past 
disasters to be avoided for the future, rather than an historical 
prologue for continuing failures of project planning. 
C. Class I Environmental Costs 
Even a casual glance at a topographic map depicting a dam 
and reservoir project profile imposed on a previously existing river 
valley, makes clear that when a dam is built some major preexisting 
features of the riverine environment will be lost. These often in-
clude some costs which fit in the category least capable of attracting 
the serious attention of economists: 
1. Displacement of Indigenous Peoples 
As Professor Paul has recently noted, JO dams in tropical areas 
often displace extremely vulnerable indigenous cultures and human 
settlements. The actual numbers of persons forced from their an-
cestral homes may be relatively small, which coupled with the fact 
spent on such projects may leave the borrowing country in a worse economic position than 
before, saddled with a ponderous burden of debt. 
9 Two standard texts setting out the basis for benefit-cost analysis of development projects 
are M. ROEMER AND J. STERN, ApPRAISAL OF DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS (1980), and UNITED 
NATIONS INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT ORGANIZATION, GUIDELINES FOR PROJECT EVALUATION 
(Project Evaluation and Formulation Series, No.2, Vienna 1982). 
10 J.e.N. Paul, The World Bank, Human Rights and Development: Some Obligations of the Bank, 
17 DEN. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 67 (1989). 
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that they are often primitive or minority tribes further diminishes 
the attention they receive from national and international devel-
opment officials. For some cultures and some peoples, however, the 
dislocation means death. The Bayano Dam in Panama, for instance, 
eliminated eighty percent of the settled villages of the Cuna Indi-
ans.ll As with the Tucurui Dam in Brazil (chronicled in the semi-
fictional movie "The Emerald Forest"), some dam area dislocatees 
have been pushed into the territory of enemy peoples, leading to 
the decimations of tribal warfare. Even where communal clashes 
and warfare are not their fate, the dislocated indigenous peoples, 
who may never have received notice from national authorities prior 
to the rise of impounded waters in their homelands, often lose their 
religious culture as well, since many such peoples are deistic and 
intimately tied to the physical features of their environment. 
In the forced migrations of both primitive and modernized 
dislocatees, there is always serious disruption of social and economic 
life, the straining or splitting of family ties, often producing disas-
sociated personality traits, accompanied by alcoholism or other an-
tisocial effects, the migration of destitute individuals to cities, and 
so on. The numbers of dispossessed may in some cases be quite 
large. The Xingu Dams currently being urged upon the World Bank 
by some of its staff and by the government of Brazil, would flood 
more than 4,000 square kilometers. 12 The Narmada Dams project 
in India would ultimately displace more than 1.5 million people,13 
in a process that has already begun with its first dam, the Sardar 
II Hanlon, supra note 7, at 20, (citing Wali, Hydroelectricity, Past and Present: Problems of 
Social Impact Assessment, I GLOBAL REPORTER 4 (1983). The Bayano Dam is a complex con-
structed between 1972 and 1976 in the Bayano River Basin of Eastern Panama. The project 
resulted in the flooding of approximately 250 square kilometers of the Bayano River Basin, 
displacing the majority of Cuna Indians, yet the Indians have not yet received any electricity 
generated by the complex. Hanlon, supra note 7, at 19-20. 
12 Castanheira, supra note 2. The Kayapo Indians inhabit the Xingu river basin, and 
oppose the building of the Babaquara and Kasasa6 dams on the river. The dams are expected 
to flood 7,200 square kilometers of rain forests and force displacement of the Kayapo and 
thousands of other Indians and Brazilians. In February the Kayapo erected a village on the 
proposed site of the project to prevent the beginning of construction. However, the Brazilian 
government is getting tough with the Kayapo. In February 1988, the government charged 
the two Kayapo chiefs, Kubei and Paiakan (and their American translator, anthropologist 
Darrel Posey) with violation of a federal law forbidding foreigners (!) from conspiring against 
the national interest. The hearings have been delayed by the chiefs' attendance in native 
tribal dress, which the court considers disrespectful. If found guilty, they face up to three 
years in prison. On the Move Against Xingu Dams, Vol. 4, No.1, World Rivers Review 
January/February 1989. 
13 ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 13. 
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Sarovar Dam which is now in the process of dispossessing 70,000. 14 
Boghdat (Indira Sarovar) Dam, also in India would displace tens of 
thousands more. 15 Even these large numbers, however, are often 
treated as relatively insignificant by the national and MDB devel-
opment officials who plan the projects. After all, the Indian sub-
continent now has 783 million people and will be well over a billion 
by the year 2000. The "oustees" as they are officially termed rep-
resent little political consequence; they are small tribal and ethnic 
minorities in the vast Indian state. 
2. Rare and Endangered Wildlife 
In addition to the loss of habitat for wildlife generally,16 the 
elimination of river valleys often destroys the last refuge of endan-
gered species that contribute to the diversity of natural life forms 
on the planet. In the case of the Indira Sarovar Dam for instance, 
(which would have a capacity of only 106 megawatts) the dam would 
eliminate a major part of some of India's most endangered species, 
including the Bengal tiger, the mouse deer, the sloth bear, a partic-
ular species of buffalo, and a giant squirrel species. The Nam Choan 
Dam on the River Kwai Yai in Thailand will eliminate the six rarest 
animal species in that nationY Rare plant species too are typically 
lost in the flooding of a river. 
These costs are of little moment to development planners and 
financiers, however, because they seem to represent only aesthetic 
values of a rather recherche elite. In fact there is a utilitarian argu-
14 The Indian oustees who had legal title were promised title to land elsewhere, but the 
program has worked poorly to date. They have been left in many cases with uncultivable 
land that is not irrigated, a further irony since irrigation is a posited benefit of the dam. For 
more information on the Indian dam projects, see Tuchow, Tribal Land Protection: Lessons 
from the Sardar Sarovar Conflict (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file with author). 
15 Recently it was reported that the Indian government has formally asked the World 
Bank to cancel the Indira Sarovar Dam project based upon reevaluations determining that 
the national interest was better served without it. 3 EARTH ISLAND J. 13 (1988). 
16 Oman, How Dams Disrupt the Elephant Habitat, 3 EARTH ISLAND J. 33 (1988). For 
example, the habitat of elephants in southern India is being flooded, and their migratory 
routes blocked, by the reservoirs and canals associated with various dam projects in Kerala 
state, near the Anamalai-Parambikulam wildlife sanctuaries. Elephants, as well as other 
animals, have been swept away and drowned in the swift currents of the canals as they try 
to take water or cross them. The six or more new dam projects being planned for Kerala 
will wipe out much of the area's remaining forest habitat. 
17 Hanlon, supra note 7, at 19. Hanlon notes that twenty-five of the forty-one mammal 
species (including the six rarest species) would be adversely affected by the scheme. While 
the World Bank's environmental assessment team apparently realized these catastrophic 
effects, it refused to take action to safeguard the species' habitats. /d. 
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ment to be made for the preservation of endangered species - that 
from them may come, if we save them, knowledge about important 
medicines and chemical processes, the structure of which we will 
never discover if we throwaway the natural models, "like burning 
a book before we've learned to read it" - but such arguments do 
not present immediate fiscal payoffs, so the preservation of rare 
and endangered wildlife is typically resigned to the status of a 
philosophic ideal, honored in the breach. 
3. Archaeological Losses 
Over aeons past, human settlements have usually been located 
along rivers, hence major human archaeological sites are likely to 
be lost when a river is dammed. In the proposed U samacinta Dam 
project area along the Mexican-Guatemalan border, for instance, 
there appear to be many unexplored Mayan sites that will never be 
seen and understood before they are forever swallowed up under 
the waters and mud of another reservoir. As environmentalists in 
the U.S. have learned, archaeological sites do not possess direct 
economic value in terms relevant to the development planners who 
undertake reservoir projects, so their loss is not considered to pres-
ent much of a utilitarian argument for negative accounting. 
D. Class II Environmental Costs 
This is the area of project-caused diseconomies which is most 
often covered by revisionist resource economists, and includes by 
far the longest checklist of problems: 
1. Deforestation 
Tropical forests usually represent a major national asset in 
sustainable timber resource supply, as well as constituting a major 
source of oxygen recharge and ecosystem maintenance. The world's 
tropical forests, however, are being eliminated at a rate of one to 
two percent a year under the onslaught of slash-and-burn agricul-
ture and national transmigration campaigns often funded by 
MDBs.18 Dams accelerate the process, removing major segments of 
tropical forests, often with little relation to the scope of benefits 
provided. The Balbina Dam in Brazil, which was recently completed 
with funds from a World Bank energy sector loan at the cost of 
18 ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 4. 
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$800 million, has been officially described as "a disaster." Currently 
not functioning, the dam has destroyed 2430 square kilometers to 
provide only 125 megawatts of power capacity.19 
2. Water Quality Effects 
Beyond the acidification of impounded waters referred to be-
low, water quality behind dams typically suffers serious degradation. 
Even if the muddiness and suspended solids precipitate out in the 
sedimentation process, impounded water is typically loaded with 
nutrients. When its flows are further warmed by sunlight, it often 
blossoms into a thick algal soup, with substantial deoxygenation and 
proliferation of waterweed. Though fish populations often increase 
dramatically in the first few years of an impoundment's life, the 
disturbed balance of the riverine ecosystem typically makes fish 
populations crash five to ten years after project completion, and 
waterweed and algae then take over the impoundment. 20 Chemical 
herbicides can be used to attempt to control the waterweed problem, 
but these of course cost money and create major potential local 
health hazards as a further spin-off effect. 
3. Other Fish Losses 
The downstream effects of dams also cause major changes in 
the fish life of a river system. As in the case of the Three Gorges 
Dam in China, for example, there may be not only a threat of loss 
of nutrients and historical temperature conditions downriver, but 
also the saturated nitrogen level problems caused by high dams may 
give downstream fish "the bends," engorging their organs with 
nitrogen bubbles that kill them. 21 
4. Other Downriver Effects 
As the Aswan Dam illustrated most familiarly, the impound-
ment of a river eliminates ancient flooding cycles which typically 
have been built into the ecological and human balance of river valley 
19 See generally Castanheira, supra note 2. 
20 The boom-to-bust progression is well known in the fisheries literature, and has led to 
attempts to manage water levels at cross-purposes with energy and irrigation functions. See 
G.E. HALL, RESERVOIR FISHERIES, (Am. Fisheries Soc. 1976); Keith, Management by Water Level 
Manipulation, in BLACK BASS BIOLOGY AND MANAGEMENT 489 (H. Clepper, Ed. 1975). 
21 See Weitkamp and Katz, A Review of Dissolved Gas Supersaturation Literature, 109 TRANS-
ACTIONS OF THE AMERICAN FISHERIES SOC. 659 (1980). 
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use downstream. The lack of seasonal floods can eliminate the 
refertilizing effect of sediment deposition; without the recharge 
from upstream erosion, land adjacent to the downstream sediment 
flow is cut away and disappears, particularly in the estuaries where 
entire deltas can slowly dissipate. 22 
5. Seismic Effects and Mudslides 
The collection of a large mass of water accumulates immense 
weight on the area of the damsite and impoundment, weight so 
unnatural that it may actually throw off the subterranean geological 
balance of a region, triggering earthquake and other seismic effects. 
Mud slides may also reduce the effect of the impoundment, trig-
gered by wave erosion undercutting adjacent riparian slopes or by 
destabilization caused by human deforestation efforts attracted by 
the reservoir development itself. 
6. Human Dislocation Effects 
As noted earlier in the case of indigenous peoples, the dislo-
cation of human settlements can pose serious problems to the in-
habitants involved. There are also tangible indirect economic costs 
that may be felt in national and regional terms, as people are shifted 
from more fertile to less fertile lands, and packed into higher dens-
ities than prior to the impoundment which eliminated the land of 
the oustees.23 
7. Disease 
The spread of the snail-borne schistosomiasis bilharzia parasite 
in the Aswan system is well known. In addition to schistosomiasis, 
dams cause diseases in a broad range of cases including the spread 
of onocheriasis or river blindness, and increased exposure to ma-
laria. At the Tehri Dam, for instance, the project has recently been 
blamed for the exposure of more than eight million people to 
malaria parasites, in a residual effect that had been known to health 
scientists at least since Ghana's Volta Dam project which was com-
22 Like Aswan, the Three Gorges Dam will cause coastal erosion and saltwater intrusion 
problems. ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 12-13. 
23 Tuchow, supra note 14, at 9 (citing Colchester, The World Bank Ignores Human Suffering 
and is in Breach of International Law, THE ECOLOGIST 286 (1985), and Kalpavriksh, The Narmada 
Valley Projects: Development or Destruction?, in THE SOCIAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL EFFECT OF 
LARGE DAMS 224 (Goldsmith and Hildyard, eds. (1986». 
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pleted more than two decades earlier in 1959.24 The health effects 
caused by dams are often accentuated by the fact that they occur 
in regions far removed from cities and other locations with estab-
lished health care supply. Nevertheless they do not seem to attract 
the prior attention of project planners. 
8. Irrigation Problems 
Schistosomiasis and other waterborne diseases are carried by 
the irrigation systems of dam projects, but there are other serious 
diseconomies that can occur in irrigation programs. Lands which 
are irrigated, especially in hot climates, tend to concentrate what-
ever mineral salts exist in the river water, thereby producing an 
increasingly salinized soil system through the process of evapora-
tion. India's Punjab has large sections of once-arable land now salted 
by intense irrigation.25 In other cases, as in the Kiambere Dam and 
Bura irrigation projects on Kenya's Tana River, the lands irrigated 
may turn out to be unsuitable for the intensive levels of irrigated 
agriculture posited by the engineers as the basis for irrigation ben-
efits. In the latter project, for instance, the World Bank sponsored 
project has turned out to have less than half the irrigatable hectares 
than it planned to develop, seriously diminishing the benefits prom-
ised to the dislocated populations, and raising the cost of those 
benefits to an average of more than $20,000 per household. 
9. Sabotage Potential 
Another major potentially catastrophic diseconomy which typ-
ically is not discussed by project planners is that the focus of so 
much capital, technology, and pent-up hydrologic pressure at one 
location increases the nation's and the downstream local region'S 
vulnerability to sabotage. A high dam more than 200 meters tall, 
backing up millions of tons of water, may be less than 10 meters 
thick in poured concrete at its base. One car bomb driven over the 
dam anywhere along its upriver side could wipe out the investment 
24 Hanlon, supra note 7, at 15. The economic burden of caring for these Indian malaria 
victims was not included in the World Bank's sector report or financial development package 
in preparing the estimated costs of the Dam. Id. (citing Ecoforum, December 1982, and 
Environmental Impact of Multilateral Development Bank-Funded Projects: Hearing Before the Sub-
committee on International Development Institutions and Finance of the House Committee on Banking, 
Finance and Urban Affairs, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. 37, 41 (1983) (statements of Dr. Brent 
Blackwelder and Bruce Rich, Esq.». 
25 See THREATENED PEOPLES, supra note 2. 
184 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORW LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9: 169 
as well as the downstream population, cities, and economy.26 Even 
without active sabotage, moreover, dams may contribute seriously 
to civil unrest. Frustration and anger against the Chico Dam plans 
in Ferdinand Marcos' Philippines were apparently the instrumental 
reason why many local peasants and tribals whose political affiliation 
previously had been toward the Presbyterian missionary church, 
turned toward the communist New Peoples Army. 
10. Class Dislocation 
Other politico-economic effects of big dams dis equilibrate hu-
man social ecology as well as natural ecology. Poor people most 
often suffer the losses of large dam projects, while the more mod-
ernized and wealthier sectors of the population typically are those 
which are able to reap the benefits of dam construction; the tensions 
thereby produced can have substantial effects. 
11. Dysfunctional Settlement Patterns 
When a dam goes into an area, it typically attracts hordes of 
unskilled laborers who flock to the area in an ad hoc inflow migra-
tion from other areas of the country. As in the Brazilian projects, 
the immigrants often exacerbate problems by killing or exploiting 
the indigenous residents of the region, throwing up shanty towns, 
establishing settlements lacking in government services, and prac-
ticing a form of agriculture that may accelerate the deterioration of 
land quality. Increased inappropriate agricultural practices, such as 
slash-and-burn agriculture and slope farming, may also drastically 
increase sediment loads pouring into the impoundments. 
12. Loss of Foregone Development Assets 
Implicit in a number of the foregoing categories is the fact that 
dams not only eliminate the particular assets and resources located 
in their impoundment areas, but eliminate as well whatever poten-
tial there was for appropriate economic development based upon 
those assets. The loss of fertile soils is a classic example. The most 
fertile soils of any region typically are those lying in the river valleys. 
These are the soils which will be completely eliminated as a useful 
26 The only recorded instance of this type of sabotage happened during the Second 
World War, but it has been rumored that the United States government has recently given 
plans of several dams, built in Nicaragua with U.S. aid, to the leadership of the contra guerilla 
forces, for whatever use they make of them. 
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national resource by the effects of an impoundment (The fertility 
of the soils, instead of raising crops, then contributes to dysfunc-
tional biological oxygen demand and algal pollution effects of the 
impoundment). In this regard, it is politically understandable why 
engineering and feasibility studies for large dams never include 
agricultural maps classifying the quality of soils that will be lost 
under the impoundments. In the same way, they rarely include 
maps showing archaeological losses, or losses of mineral deposits 
which will be placed under water, etc. The project planning maps 
typically take account only of topographic dimensions, and of the 
discrete towns and commercial centers existing within the projected 
reservoir areas, entities which clearly will require removal opera-
tions. To register the existence of valuable assets to be lost in the 
project area would directly undercut the project's cost-benefit ratios, 
and hence is counterintuitive to development planners. 
13. Cumulative Effects 
The practical reality of a large dam project is that many of the 
foregoing costs have cumulative synergistic effects. The biological, 
human, social, and economic effects of a series of dam projects in 
a region can cause qualitatively greater compounded problems, as 
populations grow more densely settled, on less fertile ground, with 
more susceptibility to disease, and less food available. 
14. Alternative Technologies Avoided 
Finally, a further logical loss caused by major capital focus on 
dam projects is that they foreclose a nation's ability to undertake 
alternative technologies for development. The $500 million Nam 
Choan Dam in Thailand, for instance, will cause a host of environ-
mental problems, and the cost of its construction and its electrical 
power supply system will prevent Thailand from investing in co-
generation technology. (Cogeneration could have produced more 
gigawatt hours than the dam for only one-fourth the dam project's 
cost, by providing appropriate generation facilities in conjunction 
with the boilers of already-existing sugar processing plants through-
out the country.)27 In 1986 it was predicted that electricity con-
sumption by major power users in Brazil could be cut thirty percent 
by the year 2000 through energy conservation and efficiency mea-
27 Statement of Bruce Rich, 1987 Hearings, supm note 2. 
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sures. Such programs would cost $10 billion compared to the $44 
billion that building the dysfunctional structures generating 22,000 
megawatts of unnecessary power would cost. The institutional ini-
tiative and bureaucratic mass represented by dam projects, in other 
words, foreclose the implementation of potentially more beneficial 
national development strategies, and that cost can be large and 
cumulative. 
Further, dam projects may produce benefits that are not par-
ticularly needed by a nation, and promote inappropriate low-mul-
tiplier exploitative industries. The Bakun Dam in Sarawak, besides 
eliminating five thousand tribal people and contributing to serious 
deforestation problems, is being built as a location for the Reynolds 
Aluminum Co. Pollution laws in the Federal Republic of Germany 
prevented Reynolds Aluminum from expanding its operations 
along the Elbe River and hence it will move its operations and its 
pollution to the Third World.28 
E. Class III Environmental Costs 
It is extraordinary to discover that a major environmental cat-
egory of project defects that are quite serious, quite foreseeable, 
and not at all "external" to project accounting, has nevertheless 
regularly escaped the prior attention, and subsequently haunted the 
project efforts, of international dam builders: 
1. Sedimentation 
Rivers carry suspended solids eroded from upstream in their 
watersheds. When the flow of a river is slowed behind a dam, the 
soils and sand carried by the water precipitate downward, and can 
fill up a reservoir impoundment area with remarkable speed. One 
large Soviet project on the Yellow River in China so miscalculated 
the sedimentation rate that the dam was filled up with mud deposits 
before it was even finished. It now stands as an embarrassing al-
batross, the river flowing straight over its spillway with no effective 
water storage impoundment effect.29 The Tehri Dam in India was 
28 International discussions have been occurring in the past two years about the negoti-
ation of a multilateral convention prohibiting "pollution flight" to the Third World. This 
would be a salutary initiative that nevertheless raises mixed feelings in developing nations 
that hope for new cash flows at the same time that they worry about exploitation as the 
dumping ground for the detritus of Western industry. See infra note 36. 
29 See Williams, supra note 2, at 11, briefly describing the plight of the Laoying Reservoir 
in China. 
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planned to produce benefits over a serviceable life of at least 100 
years. Because of sedimentation, it currently is likely to be filled up 
in thirty to forty years. 30 The Tarbela Dam in Pakistan completed 
in the 1970's will have mud levels reaching its hydroelectric intakes 
by 1992, requiring multi-million dollar retrofitting to attempt to 
rectify the situation. The $20 billion Three Gorges Dam project in 
China risks massive sedimentation from its impoundment effect on 
the muddy Yangtze River, sedimentation which is unlikely to be 
prevented by recently designed diversion tunnels near the dam 
site.31 
Sedimentation, moreover, turns out to be a problem that is not 
restricted to areas near the dam. Waters slow their rate of flow far 
upstream, where they enter the impoundment, in some cases be-
ginning to deposit their sediment loads a hundred miles from the 
dam structure itself, causing obstructions and water elevations un-
foreseen by the engineers.32 As noted above, sedimentation also 
causes a large number of indirect Class II diseconomies that are 
typically ignored by feasibility studies.33 
~ecause sedimentation so seriously eliminates water storage 
capacity, cutting down on hydroelectric and irrigation potential, it 
is simply extraordinary that engineering feasibility studies can re-
peatedly ignore or underestimate its effects. 
2. Scour and Other Structural Effects 
Large dams produce downstream discharges of tremendous 
force, which can cause major local environmental effects and in 
some cases cause unforeseen destructive effects to the dam struc-
tures themselves. The Tarbela Dam, for example, had a concrete 
30 Hanlon, supra note 7, at 16 (citing 1987 Hearings, supra note 2, at 42 (statement of Dr. 
Brent Blackwelder)). 
31 See generally ECOLOGICAL DESTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 12. 
32 When rivers deposit their suspended solids at the upstream end of a reservoir they 
form large sand bars or mud bars that rise toward the level of the reservoir itself. Because 
the suspended grains of sand and soil interlock upon deposition, they are not readily dis-
lodged by the slightly increased water flows that occur over their upper surface. Accordingly 
the "hump" of deposited sediments grows and forces the waters to go higher to pass over its 
mass, in turn causing further upriver sediment deposits. As this process of upstream hump 
deposition continues, the upstream elevation of the reservoir may be as much as a meter 
higher than the elevation of the reservoir at the dam structure itself, thereby flooding many 
more kilometers of terrain than the engineers had foreseen, totally changing the hydrologic 
characteristics of the planned impoundment. I am indebted to Dr. Philip Williams for 
information on this and other details of hydrologic problems affecting dams. 
33 See supra text accompanying notes 19-25. 
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spillway that produced such strong flows that they began to cut the 
spillway itself away on the downstream side, requiring construction 
of a massive deflector system rushed into place to control the de-
structive process. 
3. Destructive Water Quality 
Large dams typically cause major offsite Class II water quality 
consequences. In a number of tropical dams, particularly those like 
Brazil's Tucurui or Balbina dams, where large amounts of trees and 
vegetation were inundated without being removed from the reser-
voir area prior to impoundment,34 there is a marked increase in the 
acidity of the rivers' waters. This not only has ecological effects, but 
also causes extensive corrosion of hydroelectric turbines so that they 
can be used for only a fraction of their normal working lives. 
Drifting vegetation and logs, moreover, clog turbines and spillways 
in a long continuing process in which the organic materials of the 
impoundment area break down and slowly drift downstream. 
4. Structural Failure 
Approximately one percent of the world's dams actually do fail, 
sometimes because their bedrock geology was not sufficiently stud-
ied (as with the Teton Dam in the United States); in others seismic 
effects are generated by the dams themselves, by having such huge 
masses of water collected in fragile geological zones.35 
These obvious and direct Class III costs have often been used 
by environmentalists in trying to build cases for modification or 
abandonment of international dam projects. Though they represent 
serious concerns (and also, as we have seen, have spillover effects 
into more extended Class II diseconomies), the momentum of the 
development process still produces contemporary dam project de-
signs that do not take sufficient account of even these most direct 
project problems, which is perplexing in the light of the promoters' 
purported project orientation. 
F. Summary: MDB Dam Projects Cause Significant Real Environmental 
Costs 
In sum, the catalog of potential and existing problems caused 
by large dam projects is sobering, and would seem to require logical 
34 See Castanheira, supra note 2, at 138. 
35 See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 10. 
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consideration along with the glowing promises of development that 
typically accompany such proposals. Serious environmental prob-
lems do occur. Many development projects have only narrowly pos-
itive benefit-cost ratios, even when using optimistic official benefit 
projections and restrictive cost estimates. Given such marginality, it 
,would seem evident that many of these projects, if account were 
taken of their real costs, would produce net disbenefits to their 
struggling nations' economies. The World Bank has been a major 
part of the problem, spending $30 billion for large dams in the 
Third World. Despite recent improvements in World Bank policy 
at least 400,000 persons have been involuntarily displaced from 
reservoir impoundment areas since 1979, with another 1.5 million 
impending in India's Narmada project. Indeed, the momentum of 
the World Bank lending process over past decades not only failed 
to prevent but appears to have created, fostered and encouraged 
diseconomic projects in a number of Third World nations. 
III. ADMINISTRATION PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND REFORMS 
A. The Causes of the Problems 
Faced with the preceding catalogue of diseconomies and their 
serious cumulative effects, the question must be asked, how is it that 
they can have occurred? At one level the answer is that apparently, 
in many cases in the past at least, the potential occurrence of these 
environmental harms (even those disruptive effects which directly 
undercut the project itself, our Class III effects), were to a major 
degree simply ignored in large dam development projects. The 
engineers and financial development planners who hypothesized 
and created projects did not take account of a wide array of negative 
economically tangible and intangible effects. At another level, how-
ever, the question must be asked why the process did so ignore 
predictable and measurably substantial diseconomies. 
To surmise how the international lending process may go as-
kew, it is not irrelevant to view the process from an environmentalist 
observer's perspective. To an environmentalist, the problem comes 
down to the fact that the MDB development loan process is a closed 
system which quite naturally resists consideration of the negative 
consequences of its own development mission. 
A large dam project can be given birth in a number of different 
ways, by the request of a borrowing nation government, by the 
suggestion of international engineering and construction companies 
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(which often lobby Third World governments to urge them to re-
quest dams), and the like. If one goes back through project histories, 
however, the primary project initiators in many cases are the mul-
tilateral development bank's staffers themselves. Bank staff con-
stantly review conditions in developing regions and, as in the case 
of the World Bank, prepare "sector analyses" which hypothesize a 
variety of different development projects which may be attractive 
opportunities for World Bank loans. 
Already environmentalist observers would assert that there is a 
problem. Within the World Bank, staffers have "lending targets," 
levels of monetary lending that the Bank wishes to achieve in a 
given year; these lending targets are typically increased annually by 
the Bank's management. This form of incentive loads the dice in 
favor of large capital-intensive projects and against lower-budget 
alternatives that ultimately might prove to be more fitting devel-
opment initiatives for the conditions of target nations. Appropriate 
lower-tech alternatives may exist, but it may take as much time and 
effort to prepare plans for them - for agricultural cooperative 
systems, decentralized low-technology production facilities, public 
education, low mechanization modern agriculture, and other de-
centralized infrastructure projects - as it would for a large dam 
project. To some MDB staff, it surely must be more enticing to use 
their time to produce a multi-million dollar dam rather than a 
lower-budget, lower-tech appropriate development project. 
The borrower country makes a formal request for MDB con-
sideration of the dam project. Most developing nations, it should 
be noted, do not have a heightened sensitivity to the kinds of 
environmental costs noted herein, and share the common impres-
sion that environmentalism is Western aesthetic luxury, and a con-
tradiction to the growth of national economic revenues. If devel-
oped nations want to talk about environmental restraints on the 
Third World, having amassed wealth and momentum by despoiling 
their own resources, they should pay the developing nations for the 
privilege.36 The "North-South" equity debate reflects the fact that 
36 This North-South debate, fueled by belated scientific recognition of the immense 
importance of rain forests and savannahs to global oxygen cycles and climatic equilibrium, 
understandably strikes some developing nations as post-colonial condescension and exploi-
tation. In the late 1960s President Jomo Kenyatta of Kenya argued often, in his so-called 
"Arusha principle," that developed Western nations should pay far the privilege of pushing 
their environmental scruples upon the Third World. It is a concept that has recently resur-
faced in promising "debt-far-nature" swaps, whereby developing nations agree to set aside 
vulnerable regions and resources in return for a measure of debt forgiveness. 
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humankind has long assumed that states generally develop wealth 
by pillaging natural resources. A sign of the realities of project 
planning, moreover, is that in some cases the borrowing country 
government may not even be actively involved with the preparation 
of its own request, and may get to see it as prepared by the MDB 
staff only shortly before the time the formal request is actually 
made. 
Within the MDB as well as the borrowing nation, the invention 
of the dam's name gives the project a concrete identity from that 
point on. It becomes "the Dunkoro Dam Project," and the referent 
is clear: a particular place, a particular kind of project, a known 
development commodity, a particularly highly-focused form of cap-
ital investment, and a particular set of stirring development images 
- mighty piers of concrete, thundering spillways, clouds of white 
spume with electrical transmission towers in the background. 
After having been hypothesized and requested, the proposed 
dam project goes into the feasibility study stages.37 This is very much 
a closed process, typically carried out by MDB staff and/or working 
groups from engineering firms involved in the development profes-
sion. There is typically no input whatsoever from those who will be 
most directly affected by the dam proposal, and often very little 
input from the borrowing country government. Feasibility studies 
tend to be construction analyses done by the potential construction 
interests. The feasibility study for the Three Gorges Dam in China, 
for instance, was prepared by a consortium of Canadian corpora-
tions who are likely to be prime candidates for the construction of 
the dam itself.38 Multinational contractors are an intimate part of 
the development profession, and typically play an active role within 
the MDB planning process. The graphics prepared in the feasibility 
studies incorporate the shortcomings noted in the environmental 
overview above: they tend to focus on the dam structure itself and 
its reservoir impoundment, on projected power demand curves and 
repayment schedules. The studies do not include maps of the nat-
ural assets that will be eliminated by the project, soil maps showing 
the fertile soils that will be inundated, and make little or no attempt 
to assess intangible costs and potential development assets foregone. 
Feasibility studies generally tend to prove the feasibility of the proj-
ect as hypothesized. 
37 See generally WARREN C. BAUM, THE PROJECT CYCLE (1982) [hereinafter THE PROJECT 
CYCLE]' 
3" ECOLOCICAL DESTRUCTION, supra note 2, at 12. 
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After the identification and preparation stages in the project 
cycle, the dam proposal passes to the project appraisal report stage. 
At this point the staff takes the initial feasibility studies and prepares 
an overall presentation of the project for the Board, typically in-
cluding an overall benefit-cost assessment.39 Prior to 1987, this ap-
praisal stage was the only occasion where the small environmental 
staff of the World Bank was required to have any formal involve-
ment in the project analysis process. Unfortunately, project ap-
praisal reports replicate much of the same mission momentum dis-
cernible in prior stages of the process. The benefit projections 
typically (at least from the perspective of outside observers, envi-
ronmental analysts, and resource economists) tend to inflate esti-
mated potential benefits, and constrain the range and magnitude 
of estimated project costs, direct and indirect. The environmental 
inputs and commentary on projects at this stage tend to be rather 
flaccid and forlorn. In the case of the Nam Choan Dam on the 
River Kwai Yai, for instance, noting the presence of six endangered 
species, the environmental staff was merely able to insert the com-
ment that these rarest species "will be forced to move elsewhere."4o 
The tone of the environmental staff was resigned to the inevitability 
of project completion, positing a biological relocation which in sci-
entific terms was highly unlikely to be successful. 
In some cases projected benefits do not aggregate sufficient 
amounts to, justify projected costs. World Bank project appraisal 
reports have occasionally based their subsequent affirmative judg-
ments that a project should move forward on the assertion that the 
dam would create substantial amounts of "unquantified benefits." 
This rationale is paralleled by American porkbarrel construction 
agencies which claim intangible multiplier effects on the plus side 
of the ledger while typically avoiding consideration of unquantified 
negatives. 
In some cases, as with the Narmada project, the ministries 
within the borrowing country government which had been pro-
moting the development loan bypass normal domestic review by 
those ministries that might raise questions regarding indigenous 
peoples, population resettlement problems, and environmental im-
pacts. In the Narmada case the government of India had not issued 
its environmental clearance, as required under Indian law, prior to 
39 See generally THE PROJECT CYCLE, supra note 37. 
40 Hanlon, supra note 7, at 19 (citing 1987 Hearings, supra note 2, at 40 (statement of Dr. 
Brent Blackwelder)). 
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project approval. The necessary studies had not been made, yet the 
environment ministry was finally pressured into making a "prelim-
inary approval" without factual record so as to permit execution of 
the loan. 
Prior to final loan commitment, the project must be finally 
approved by the Board of Directors. Sitting atop a process which 
has gone from "lending target," through increasing institutional 
investment in the production of the dam proposal, substantial mo-
mentum has by this time been generated within the MDB. It is little 
wonder that the executive directors, at least until recently, rarely if 
ever refused to approve such projects, absent extraordinary exter-
nal pressures. 41 
B. An Environmental Perspective on the Process 
Looking at this development process, environmental analysts 
would note the institutionalized mission orientation throughout the 
stages of project development that narrows the scope of planning 
considerations and makes the ultimate project a foregone conclu-
sion. The process is dominated by the engineering perspective -
what can be done physically, with existing technology - and by the 
multifaceted inducements of large capital-intensive projects. There 
are institutional benefits for all the varied interests in the develop-
ment profession, for multinational construction corporations and 
their home governments (Italy and France, for example, have often 
taken a strong role in encouraging construction of such large proj-
ects by their own nationals), for promotional "insiders" within the 
borrowing country (development ministries and those interests 
which will profit most directly in fiscal and political terms from the 
project activity), and for the MDB itself. The active participants in 
the formation and development of the particular project become 
personally invested in its progress. The participating interests will 
profit either in fiscal terms or in mission terms with a sense of 
accomplishment of having built a specific large dam. 
Environmentalists would analyze this problem as that of an 
immensely powerful decisional process run entirely by "insiders" 
whose direct motivations - profit, institutional momentum, political 
power accrued, etc. - are not directly tied to the overall best 
41 Some environmental observers argue that the Boards of Directors, i.e. the Executive 
Directors representing donor nations, consistently defer to the staff on major loans and 
therefore exercise little direction or control over the day to day life of the MDBs. 
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rational development of the particular country or region. The dom-
inating motivation for some if not all of the participants in the 
process is hardly likely to be "what is best for Gabon." Gabon's 
particular national needs, the environmentalists would assert, may 
merely serve as an opportunity for the engine of the development 
apparatus to "do its thing": hence the focus on building the largest 
possible projects, and the aversion to low-tech low-budget projects, 
to investment in education, to decentralized production, and the 
like. 42 
Such critics recognize, in other words, that rational accounting 
as a goal may actually miss the real motivations of some of the 
development establishment as it applies to a particular project. Ra-
tionality is not necessarily the dominating internal drive. The al-
truistic desire to transfer maximum benefits to a needy people is 
not always the dominating reward or motive for large capital-inten-
sive project promoters. The self-serving motivations of human na-
ture at large are what environmentalists see, and to some extent of 
course, there probably is truth in their observation that human 
organizations tend to seek to perpetuate themselves. There is an 
institutional need to sustain and expand activity in order to justify 
organizational existence, and there is ego gratification to the human 
mind in the image of something very large that has resulted from 
one's efforts. Profits for some of the actors in the development 
process are also certainly a motivation and in some cases perhaps it 
is even corruption that actually pushes along projects that involve 
billions of dollars of cash flow in less developed countries. There is 
also a sort of engineer's technological imperative - what can be 
built must be built. In the case of dams, moreover, there may even 
be a touch of atavistic magic. There is something visceral in the 
pleasure that comes from making nature do one's work: throwing 
up a fragile barrier before the forces of a river's hydraulic power, 
watching the river tamed from raging torrent to placid pond, rising 
up behind a man-made wall. And there is something of an engi-
neering competition: The largest power output dam in the world, 
Itaipu in Brazil, generates about 11,000 megawatts (MW). The en-
gineers who initially planned the Three Gorges Dam in China 
42 The same overall criticisms have recently been developing with regard to the mid-
1970s orgy of borrowing, fueled by Western commercial banks' eagerness to reinvest OPEC 
petro-dollars, that helped produce the developing nations' current excruciating debt burdens. 
The process of "churning" by which banks and borrowers spun each other into an acceler-
ating dervish dance of development lending, produced many uneconomic projects whose 
failures (and consequent unrepayable debts) cannot be laid solely at the debtors' door. 
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changed its original plans so as to increase the dam's elevation 
substantially, when it became clear that raising its height could make 
it the largest generator output dam in the world at 13,000 MW. 
Since then, the planners for the dam at Xingu in Brazil are meeting 
the Three Gorges challenge, apparently planning their dam so that 
it can be the biggest.43 One wonders if there would be the same 
competition going on if the development profession were staffed 
by women instead of men. 
C. Reforms and Reformers 
It may well be that the environmental perspective is unneces-
sarily jaundiced. The record of MDB development loans for large 
dam projects over the years, continuing in the present and projected 
into the immediate future, however, indicates that serious problems 
indeed do occur. Over-capitalized and under-planned development 
initiatives with serious diseconomies are born, nurtured, and 
pushed to fruition, not prevented, by the MDB development lend-
ing mechanism. It is thus altogether likely that some of these dam 
projects should not, if there were an overall rational accounting, be 
built, and others should be undertaken only with very severe mod-
ifications and mitigations built into the project proposals. 
Rational accounting has not, until recently, been encouraged 
within the MDBs themselves. Pressures for reform were not gen-
erated within the MDB structures or within the development profes-
sion at large. Instead, the pressures have come from external re-
formers, almost exclusively non-governmental organizations in 
affected Third World regions and similar interest groups in the 
developed nations. 
The coalition that mobilized reformist pressures upon MDB 
development lending was initially put together by representatives 
of several U.S. environmental groups. These groups had developed 
extensive legal and political expertise in the course of fifteen years 
of domestic environmental initiatives, many involving water proj-
ects. The coalition included the Environmental Defense Fund, the 
Environmental Policy Institute, the National Resources Defense 
Council, Sierra Club, National Wildlife Federation, and Rainforest 
43 According to one source within the profession who would rather not be quoted by 
name, "the members of the dam building fraternity all carry around with them this little 
handbook listing the world's biggest dams; they're forever publishing papers trying to prove 
that theirs is the biggest, the tallest, the widest, the most massive, has the biggest earth-fill, 
the most water impounded, the highest generative capacity .... " 
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Action Network. Some of these groups had occasional international 
experience, but the MDB effort was innovative in the scale of its 
comprehensiveness, persistence, and international networking. The 
U.S. groups were joined by Canadian Probe International, the Brit-
ish branches of Friends of the Earth and Survival International, 
and the West German Regenwalder (Rainforest) Information. A 
critically-important ever-growing number of Third World NGOs 
also joined. These NGOs had formed to resist local development 
projects and joined the network, sometimes at the risk of their lives 
and safety.44 
This coalition began to build an analytical factual record de-
tailing the destructive consequences and diseconomies of the MDB's 
neoclassical economics approach to development lending. In the 
case of dams, they collected case examples of most of the kinds of 
project diseconomies chronicled hereinabove. The strategy was to 
focus pressure on the World Bank, assuming that the Bank would 
be potentially more responsive than the borrowing countries or the 
smaller regional MDBs. The World Bank was also politically vul-
nerable in the U.S. and many Western donor-nations because it did 
not have a significant political constituency within the U.S. Congress 
or the European parliaments. The strategy was accurate and effec-
tive. 
In functional terms, the NGO coalition urged a series of 
changes in the way MDBs planned their development projects: 
1. Early Overview Analysis 
A meaningful, comprehensive, realistic look at an early stage 
of project analysis, incorporating a sufficient rational overview, 
could insure that projects which do not make overall sense can be 
filtered out of the process early on, before they gather institutional 
investment and momentum. 
2. Active Open Consideration of Alternatives 
One of the major problems that reformers see in the process 
is that once the MDB staff and development interests have focused 
on a particular high-technology, high-capitalization project idea, 
they systematically avoid considering alternatives that might pre-
clude the construction of the proposed dam. Rational cost-benefit 
44 See Aufderheide & Rich, supra note 2, at 311-13. 
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analysis can only be accomplished by considering common sense 
alternatives to proposals. 
Some kind of environmental impact statement process, review-
able within the agency and by external observers, is useful in this 
endeavor. The indirect, intangible, or long-term diffuse and cu-
mulative diseconomies of a project need to be considered along with 
the direct projected benefits normally featured in feasibility stud-
ies.45 
Open information is also a necessary part of a rational devel-
opment loan process. MDBs have characteristically been extremely 
closed with their data while projects were brought to the point of 
construction. Nevertheless, the computer profession reminds us of 
the epigram "garbage-in-garbage-out": a decisional process can only 
be as good as the range and accuracy of the data supplied. If a 
process systematically excludes all data that is negative to completion 
of a project, then the decision will not be fully rational nor can it 
be expected that the project will develop as planned. "What the 
banks are in some need of, from the environmentalists' perspective, 
is glasnost."46 
3. Participation of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) 
NGOs are an important source of real life evidence about the 
effects of a project on a locality, a region, a nation, and even the 
planet. NGO participation is important in more than political terms. 
It assures that a wide range of real costs, as well as benefits, will be 
considered in determining the feasibility of a project. Until very 
recently the World Bank, like other MDBs, asserted that it was 
inappropriate to communicate with NGOs because it "talked only 
with governments." There was, of course, a constant flow of com-
munication between MDBs and numerous private entities, partic-
45 The United Nations' Environment Programme (UNEP) would be a fit vehicle for 
assisting in (or even taking full responsibility for) the preparation of MDB environmental 
impact statements. UNEP, formed shortly after the United Nations' Stockholm conference 
of 1972, and based in Nairobi, was established to strengthen international environmental 
protection efforts. See, e.g., Nanda & Ris, The Public Trust Doctrine: A Viable Approach to 
International Environmental Protection, 5 EcoL. L. Q. 291, 292 (1976) (citing the Report of the 
U.N. Conference on the Human Environment held at Stockholm, 5-16 June, 1972, U.N. 
Doc. AIC 48114 at 9. UNEP possesses great expertise and potential, but to date has had little 
practical effect because it has no functional substantive powers. Giving UNEP reponsibilities 
for studying and monitoring environmental impacts in MDB development projects, with 
required UNEP approvals prior to initial and supplemental funding, would strengthen UNEP 
and promote international environmental cooperation. 
46 Nanda & Ris, supra note 45, at 318. 
198 BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 9:169 
ularly multinational construction firms, development consultants, 
and representatives of regional development associations. The in-
tegration of informed NCO participants in the development plan-
ning process, however, is a way to open a conduit of relevant infor-
mation that would be otherwise excluded from development loan 
considerations. 
4. Subsequent Realistic Audits 
Projects, as they are completed and put into operation, should 
be subjected to retrospective studies to determine the extent to 
which they actually created the benefits posited and the extent to 
which extraneous diseconomies and costs caused problems. Because 
the actual performance of dams has been so problematic, it appears 
that there has never been a comprehensive overview accounting of 
the true costs and benefits of an international dam project after it 
was completed. The World Bank does prepare some retrospective 
project reports, but these are quite limited in their scope of ac-
counted costs and consequential effects. The lack of accounting 
demonstrates an aversion, environmentalists would say, to accu-
mulating the retrospective hard facts which might demonstrate that 
other ongoing projects should not be built. Retrospective audits as 
a means of mid-course correction and process feedback are a logical 
requirement of an ongoing successful development program. 
5. External Accountability 
If it is difficult for a system to police itself, it would be useful 
to have mechanisms in which outside observers could have an au-
thoritative analytical role in the process. Whether this be a form of 
judicial review, or some sort of overall economic and social review 
tribunal, external accountability is one way by which the mistakes 
of the past could realistically be improved upon. 
The reformers who have been attempting to implement these 
functional improvements in the MDB development loan system 
have generally been skeptical of MDB reform from within. They 
rarely have found it practical to focus their efforts on intellectual 
persuasion. For their part, the MDBs have, at least until recently, 
been inhospitable to the reform message. Over the past decade, the 
most active efforts for implementation of environmental reforms 
in the lending process have come from outside the institutional 
structure. In Third World dam locations, for example, projects have 
been resisted through strikes, demonstrations, sabotage, and human 
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road blocks. These methods often garner publicity, sometimes en-
couraging political re-evaluation of positions, but they have rarely 
been successful in the longer term for they fail to present their 
positions in comprehensively articulated form. Some resistance to 
the current development process has been in the nature of civil 
insurgencies. In other cases, there are political backlashes against 
development initiatives. In the developed nations, some NGOs, not 
necessarily part of the MDB reform coalition, have staged media 
events. They have attempted to embarrass MDBs by staging sit-ins 
or placing large banners with embarrassing messages on the facades 
of MDB headquarters. 
If there is value in considering the problems and potential 
reforms of the MDB development loan system, as in the case of 
international dams, there should be better ways in which the system 
can integrate the merits of these pluralistic points of view. 
IV. LEGAL AVENUES FOR REFORM AND THE QUESTION OF DONOR-
NATION PRESSURE 
Faced with a situation posing MDB development interests and 
their NGO critics at loggerheads, with important merits supporting 
different aspects of the position of each, it is altogether desirable 
that some institutionalized resolution of these issues be found within 
the legal system, rather than in protracted eco-guerilla actions in 
the media of the West and the backcountry locations of Third World 
projects. 
A. Evolving International Law Norms 
The law, of course, operates in different ways in different 
arenas. At the most general level, one approach to reforming the 
MDB lending process would involve legal initiatives to define prin-
ciples of international law. Professor Paul has analyzed how the 
definition of human rights in developing countries could provide a 
basis for MDBs to reform the process by which they may disrupt 
and dispossess indigenous populations in development areas.47 The 
dramatic human costs occasioned by the World Bank's Narmada 
project, or the Balbina and Itaparica projects in Brazil, provide a 
setting where human rights appear to be threatened. At this level, 
47 Paul, supra note 10. 
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however, the definition of international law principles is quite ab-
stract, and does not now present practically applicable legal theories. 
Some environmental activists have accordingly gone beyond the 
broad definition of human rights, to assert that in some cases MDB 
dam projects have implemented "genocide" in their effects upon 
indigenous peoples, a claim that, if it could be substantiated, could 
draw upon recognized positive international law norms and con-
ventions. Such claims of genocide, however, represent an extremely 
drastic avenue for integrating human costs into development plan-
ning. A genocide argument is not likely to promote careful adjust-
ment of interests, but rather invites inflexible polarization. 
Other broad international principles might be found in inter-
national declarations, like the U.N. Declaration on the Human En-
vironment issued at Stockholm in 1972. It could be argued that 
articles 13, 14, 15 and 25 of that Declaration in particular declare 
international law principles requiring overall review and sensitivity 
to social and natural resource diseconomies caused by development 
projects.48 The problem with the Stockholm Declaration and other 
such general declarations is, of course, that they have no direct 
practical enforceability and must await future specific implementa-
tion by U.N. action, by treaty, or by convention. 
Customary law, too, can evolve to encompass environmental 
concerns. The past decade has brought increased international 
awareness of environmental issues, especially transboundary pol-
lution issues, radioactive and otherwise. This awareness, coupled 
with relevant international declarations, can be expected to lead 
48 The text of those articles states that: 
13. In order to achieve a more rational management of resources and thus to 
improve the environment, States should adopt an integrated and coordinated ap-
proach to their development planning so as to ensure that development is compatible 
with the need to protect and improve the human environment for the benefit of 
their population. 
14. Rational planning constitutes an essential tool for reconciling any conflict be-
tween the needs of development and the need to protect and improve the environ-
ment. 
IS. Planning must be applied to human settlements and urbanization with a view to 
avoiding adverse effects on the environment and obtaining maximum social, eco-
nomic and environmental benefits for all. In this respect projects which are designed 
for colonialist and racist domination must be abandoned .... 
25. States shall ensure that international organizations playa coordinated, efficient 
and dynamic role for the protection and improvement of the environment. 
United Nations Declaration on the Human Environment, issued at Stockholm, 1972. The 
Declaration was accompanied by "Recommendations," several of which would be applicable 
to the instant debate, but with the exception of the recommendation on weather modification, 
they have received little follow-through. 
1989] MDB LOANS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS 201 
over time to the recognition of enhanced norms of environmental 
customary law. Because of the special sensitivities of the North-
South debate, however, and the diffuse effects typically internal to 
developing nations in the MDB setting, it is far more likely that the 
development of an environmental customary law will focus at least 
in the near term more upon problems in the nature of localized 
transboundary torts or delicts. 
1. International Conventions 
Some existing conventions do offer potential applicability to 
the problems posed by poorly conceived dam development projects. 
A fascinating example occurred in the Narmada project. There, 
faced with massive dislocation of indigenous peoples and little plan-
ning for relocation and mitigation of the effects on villages and 
tribal cultures, threatened indigenous peoples formed a union un-
der the auspices of the International Federation of Plantation and 
Agricultural Workers (IFPAW). In October, 1985, the IFPAW filed 
a complaint with the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 
Geneva alleging multiple violations of Convention Article 107 of 
the ILO. Under the terms of that convention, signatory nations, 
including India, are prohibited from taking development actions 
which lower the living standard of indigenous peoples or fail to 
supply them with equivalent cultivable land. 
The ILO forwarded those allegations to India, with an initial 
official expression of concern that the convention was being vio-
lated. Faced with this ILO inquiry, both the government of India 
and the World Bank responded with indignation to the interna-
tional second-guessing of their plans for Narmada. After several 
months of tense political negotiations, the ILO was persuaded to 
withdraw from its review of the effects of the Narmada project. 
Despite the fact that the ILO intervention was ultimately neutral-
ized, however, this initiative showed the potential utility of review 
and pressure embodied in existing conventions (as well as the potent 
ability of the development structure to resist such intervention).49 
49 As a further example, the Convention for the Protection of World Cultural and Natural 
Heritage, Multilateral, 27 V.S.T. 37, T.I.A.S. No. 8226, provides for each state to protect 
and conserve its cultural and natural heritage. Id. at Art. 5. After ratification by the requisite 
number of states it may also be construed as reflecting an evolving statement of international 
customary law. "Natural Heritage" includes "geological and physiographical formations and 
precisely delineated areas which constitut.e the habitat of threatened species of animals and 
plants of outstanding universal value from the point of view of science or conservation." Id. 
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2. Internal MDB "Law" 
Within the MDBs as well, there are several kinds of "law" which 
can have an effect in implementing a reform of the development 
process.50 In 1980, for example, all the major MDBs signed a "Dec-
at Art. 2. The convention also states that the duty of ensuring the conservation of cultural 
and national heritage situated on its territory belongs to the State. Id. at Art. 4. 
50 It may be helpful to compare briefly the internal structure of the International Bank 
for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank) and the International Monetary Fund. 
The Bank and the Fund are separate international organizations with distinct characters. 
Both the Bank and the Fund are currently involved with developing countries in Africa, 
Latin America and Asia. Both organizations, however, were formed at the Bretton Woods 
Conference of 1944 with an eye toward the reconstruction of Europe after World War II. 
The main purpose of the Bank today is financing investment for the development of its 
member nations. Gold, The Relationship Between the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank, 15 CREIGHTON L. REV. 499, 504 (1982) [hereinafter The Fund and the Bank]. As a result, 
the Bank tends to involve itself in long-term financial activities focusing on particular projects 
designed to promote development of a country. Id. at 515. These activities include analyzing 
the composition and appropriateness of development programs and project evaluation. Id. 
at 514. 
Briefly, the Bank funds its lending by requiring each member to subscribe shares of its 
capital stock. Some subscriptions are always subject to the call of the Bank. The majority of 
subscribers are subject to call only when they are required to meet obligations of the Bank 
to its bondholders. Id. at 505. These obligations arise from Bank borrowing to make direct 
loans or from the Bank guaranteeing loans made by private investors. Id. The total amount 
of the Bank's outstanding guarantees, participations in loans, and direct loans cannot exceed 
100% of the unimpaired subscribed capital. Id. 
The Fund, in contrast, focuses on short to medium term financial problems. It is 
concerned with broader problems than those which the Bank addresses. The purposes of 
the Fund are set out in detail in Article 1 of the Fund charter. Briefly, the Fund is primarily 
responsible for adjusting temporary balance of payments disequilibria. The Fund is also 
responsible for evaluating and assisting its members in working out stabilization programs 
as a sound basis for economic advance. Id. at 514. These functions are by nature broader 
than the Bank's because they require international collaboration. To make collaboration 
effective the members agree to undertake certain obligations of conduct and to make the 
Fund the administrator of this conduct. Id. at 501. 
One of the most important features of membership in the Fund is "conditionality." 
Conditionality means that the Fund will not respond favorably to a member's request for use 
of its resources unless the member has formulated a program and the IMF is satisfied that 
the program is likely to succeed. Gold, The Growing Role of IMF Standby Arrangements, 1984 
J. Bus. L. 308, 312 (1984). 
Since their inception in 1944 the Fund and the Bank have grown closer in purpose. The 
Fund, for example, established an "extended facility" policy under its Second Amendment. 
This policy is designed "to assist countries with economies suffering from serious imbalances 
in international payments because of structural maladjustments in production and trade in 
countries with economies characterized by slow growth and an inherently weak balance of 
payments position that prevented pursuit of an active development policy." Gold, The Fund 
and the Bank, supra, at 515-16. The explicit relationship this policy has with development 
pushed the Fund closer to the Bank. In addition, the Fund now gives greater attention to 
savings investment and production in programs that it supports with its resources. Id. 
Similarly, the Bank has moved closer to the Fund by increasing lending for structural 
adjustment. Id. at 516-17. Under such programs the Bank can provide longer term finance 
1989] MDB LOANS AND ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS 203 
laration of Environmental Policies and Procedures Relating to De-
velopment," a general statement of commitment to integrate envi-
ronmental concerns into the development planning process. 
Unfortunately, although some MDBs including the World Bank 
took some minor actions to implement the declaration, including 
the hiring of one or more environmentalists on staff,51 in general 
the actions of the MDBs amounted to little more than symbolic 
gestures. In the World Bank, for example, a poll of the Bank's 
regional directors three years later showed that a significant number 
did not even know of the existence of the Bank's environmental 
policy declaration. 
Each MDB does have the potential to issue internal regulations 
and guidelines that would assure implementation of analysis at 
effective points in the decisional process. Until recently, however, 
there was little evident interest in doing so. The concerns of envi-
ronmentalists and indigenous peoples' advocates were treated as 
minor marginal considerations, instead of an indication of tangible 
diseconomies that might undermine the success of projects as a 
whole. 
Furthermore, there is "law" in each development loan itself, a 
sort of project-by-project "law of the case." When an MDB negoti-
ates a development loan with a borrowing country, it can build in 
whatever requirements it wishes, and these requirements can apply 
tremendous constraints upon most countries to assure that planned 
projects will not create human or ecological destruction. Unfortu-
nately, this potential is only as good as the institutional motivation 
that would put such requirements into effect and subsequently 
enforce them, and over past years such incentive has been hard to 
discern. 
The World Bank, however, can be applauded for actions it has 
taken in the past two years. On May 5, 1987, Chairman Barber 
Con able made a formal address asserting that environmental con-
siderations were not only useful ideals to integrate within the plan-
ning process, but were also substantive functional necessities to 
than the Fund or commercial banks. Id. The goal of the lending is to reduce deficits in the 
balance of payments of developing countries and to ensure that the deficits do not jeopardize 
current investment programs and activities that produce foreign exchange. Id. Thus, the 
Bank attempts to stabilize a country's balance of payment disequilibrium in the short-run to 
accomplish the long term goal of development. 
51 In 1984 the Bank incorporated comprehensive policy declarations and procedures 
into its Operations Manual, but as President Conable's address, supra note 2, implicitly 
admitted, these appear to have been honored in the breach. 
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assure successful projects. "Good ecology," he stated, "is good eco-
nomics .... If indeed the World Bank has been part of the problem 
in the past, it can and will be a strong force in finding solutions in 
the future."52 Conable's address was the first major sea change 
within the World Bank's internal government and appears to have 
led to practical results. The Bapai Dam in Nepal appears to have 
been halted subsequently under the review encouraged by the chair-
man's address. From around the world, NGOs and the environment 
ministers of borrowing countries have reported that World Bank 
staff and development interests within the particular countries have 
for the first time taken seriously the arguments, data, and environ-
mental accounting procedures long urged upon them. The Inter-
American Development Bank has hired an environmental staff. The 
African Development Bank similarly appears to have internalized 
the lesson that projects that create environmental problems will 
often have an economic backlash that renders major development 
loan initiatives nugatory. In the Itaparica Dam in Brazil, the World 
Bank insisted that the "law of the project" include not only promises 
on the part of the borrowing country government that indigenous 
people would be adequately relocated (assurances which in the past 
had often turned out to be merely rhetorical), but also that enforce-
able contracts be made with local NGOs so that if relocation efforts 
were non-existent or inadequate, the persons directly affected 
would have an immediately available legal remedy in the courts of 
the borrowing country itself. 53 
In the last two years, in fact, the World Bank has implemented 
a major reorganization, dividing its operations into four global re-
gions, with a central directorate in Washington, D.C. In 1980 the 
World Bank had one ecologist on its entire world-wide staff. In 
May, 1987, the World Bank had only three environmental reviewers 
trying to analyze 300 projects each year (in addition to various 
public relations duties!).54 After the reorganization and President 
Conable's environmental policy declaration of May 5, 1987, the 
Bank created an Environmental Department in Washington, D.C. 
and environmental units in each region. Environmental guidelines 
and the Operations Manual have been updated, and a new sensitiv-
ity to environmental diseconomies appears evident. 
52 B. eonable, Address to the World Resources Institute, supra note 2. 
53 There are reports, however, that Electrosul, a state utility, has recently reneged on 
such a promise at the last minute. See World Bank Loan, supra note 2. 
54 Rich, Funding Deforestation, supra note 2, at 3. 
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Environmental observers, skeptical as ever about internal re-
form efforts because of the inherent tensions within institutions 
between promotional momentum and protective principles, take a 
wait-and-see attitude. "We like what they're saying, but we are still 
seeing the same old stuff coming out at the end of the pipeline, 
especially in the energy sector," said one participant.55 They find 
hope in the Bank's public declarations, and in the fact that, after 
years of insistence that "the Bank will only talk to governments," 
the World Bank has entered into active dialogues with the NCOs, 
even setting up a formal "World Bank-NCO Committee" to insti-
tutionalize communication. 56 
Noting the apparent dramatic shift in MDB environmental 
consciousness, the environmental observers nevertheless skeptically 
ask why it has occurred. While they may applaud the MDB initia-
tives they have seen within the last two years, there is a strong and 
not unreasonable suspicion in the minds of many NCO observers 
that the dominating reasons for these reforms lie outside the MDBs 
themselves. 
In part, the MDBs' newfound recognition of the rational im-
portance of environmental accounting may be attributed to the 
significant 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment 
and Development,57 which was available to President Conable in 
draft form when he made his May 5 speech. This "Brundtland 
Report," prepared by a blue ribbon international commission (Mrs. 
Brundtland was Prime Minister of Norway; the U.S. representative, 
among high-ranking national officials from 22 nations, was William 
55 Telephone interview with Dr. Brent Blackwelder, 30 Nov. 1988. 
56 See, e.g., the remarkably affirmative speech by Moeen A. Quereshi, Senior Vice Pres-
ident, Operations, the World Bank, before the Society for International Development, 22 
April, 1988: 
The doors of our headquarters and of our resident missions around the world are 
open. We hope new partners for development, new allies against poverty, will come 
to see us, even as Bank staff work to seek them out .... As late as ten years ago, 
what we knew about World Bank operations in many countries depended mainly 
on bureaucratic lines of information and supervision. Within developing country 
governments, implementing agencies reported on what they were doing, and coun-
try authorities tried to maintain quality control. The Bank supervised the projects 
it financed, but within the Bank, too, we depended on bureaucratic lines of man-
agement .... In today's global village, NGO networks can report a problem in rural 
Northeast Brazil to Sao Paolo, to Brasilia and throughout the world within a week. 
Where bureaucratic eyes are astigmatic, NGOs provide vivid images of what is really 
happening at the grassroots. 
57 GRO HARLEM BRUNDTLAND, ET AL., OUR COMMON FUTURE (1987). President Conable's 
public shift in policy also followed shortly after a CBS "60 Minutes" excoriation of the Bank's 
Polonoroeste Project. See Rich, Funding Deforestation, supra note 2, at 1. 
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Ruckelshaus), issued a strong call for drastic changes in interna-
tional environmental performance. The report targeted interna-
tional economic pressures and lending programs as important 
causes of past problems and indispensable parts of necessary fun-
damental international environmental reforms. 
A further critical motivation for the World Bank's policy shift, 
however, beyond the intellectual persuasions of the Brundtland 
commission findings, appears to have been a practical threat of 
direct statutory pressure on Bank appropriations, and a subsequent 
barrage of political pressures from donor-nations, orchestrated by 
the coalition of environmental NGOs. 
3. Donor-Nation Pressure on MDB Policy 
There is no accepted analysis of the status and legitimacy of 
donor-nation pressure seeking to force particular policy initiatives 
upon international lending organizations, but actions focused on 
environmentalism and indigenous peoples have recently created 
prime examples of this phenomenon. The initial and quite dramatic 
example of such socio-ecological pressure originated in a U.S. 
congressional initiative. Over the past ten years, the NGO coalition 
based in the United States has been increasingly successful in per-
suading powerful members of Congress that capital-intensive, mul-
tilateral development projects may cause more problems than they 
solve. Drawing upon the tactics of a successful initiative against 
commercial whaling which used U.S. statutes (threatening import 
cutoffs) to apply pressure on parties to the International Whaling 
Convention, the environmental coalition levied congressional finan-
cial pressures on the MDBs. 
Senator Robert Kasten, Republican from Wisconsin and past 
chairman of the relevant Senate appropriations subcommittee, 
emerged as a particularly important congressional figure in this 
initiative, backed by current chairmen Daniel Inouye, in the Senate, 
and Representative David Obey, in the House. Over the last several 
fiscal years, Kasten and Obey have attached an elaborate statutory 
provision to the annual bill appropriating money for the World 
Bank. 58 These appropriations riders declared that the executive 
directors of MDBs appointed by the U.S. must "vigorously promote 
the integration of environmental and cultural assessments and pro-
tections in the processing of multilateral loans" and attached further 
58 See, e.g., P.L. 99-500, Title I § 161(f), 100 Stat. 1783-232 (1986). 
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practical requirements to enforce that goal. The statutory language 
is detailed, contains very specific mandates and prohibitions, and 
has been enforced by periodic accountings from the Treasury 
(which through its IDCA and N AC is directly responsible for brief-
ing the U.S. executive directors to the World Bank and other mul-
tilateral development banks). The U.S. Congress has held twenty-
one hearings on the environmental problems of Bank lending in 
the past five years. 59 Because of the pressure applied through U.S. 
legislation upon the Treasury Department, the U.S. representatives 
have undertaken critical reviews of ongoing development loan pro-
posals, and in several cases have voted against or abstained from 
loan approvals. Because the United States wields such a major block 
of votes within the MDBs (voting being proportionate to the finan-
cial sponsorship share of each nation), these actions have not created 
a merely symbolic stance, but rather have enforced upon the World 
Bank the need to pay functional attention to the environmental 
principles the American statutes represent. 
The pressures brought to bear upon the MDBs did not stop 
with the U.S. initiatives. In the past two years there have been 
growing numbers of Western donor-nations which have weighed in 
with declarations of the practical importance of environmental anal-
yses in MDB lending, and making direct requests that the MDB 
boards incorporate environmental reviews into a reformed devel-
opment loan process. These pressures have come from West Ger-
many, Great Britain, the Netherlands, and the countries of the 
Scandinavian bloc. At the Bank's recent annual meetings in Berlin, 
Canada asked the Board of Directors to implement an environmen-
tal impact statement review procedure for all development construc-
tion loan projects. 
The NGO coalition, in sum, has helped to marshal a wide range 
of external donor-nation pressures upon the MDB lending process, 
and can be credited with a fair measure of whatever successes flow 
from the ongoing MDB reforms. 
4. The Propriety of Donor-Nation Pressure on MDBs 
Even if one assumes that quite salutary environmental reforms 
have been instigated by donor-nation pressure, the use of direct 
"" By statute, moreover, the Agency for International Development in the United States 
Department of State is now required to publish a list every six months of MDB projects that 
confront environmental problems, an "early warning system." See Aufderheide & Rich, supra 
note 2, at 309-10. 
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pressure on an international compact entity raises worrisome con-
cerns in some observers' minds. No matter how altruistic, the fact 
remains that certain nations are able to have this effect upon the 
MDBs in part because they possess financial leverage on the Bank 
board. For constructive reforms on the international stage to rely 
upon altruistic bullying is a troubling concept indeed. 
What then is the propriety of a donor-nation's applying direct 
pressure to lending decisions of the Bank? The question is pre-
sented with particular clarity in the recent V.S. environmental ini-
tiative because there the V.S. Congress applied its pressure via 
direct statutory enactment (although the same issue is present in 
less formal interventions). For purposes of analysis, let us take two 
separable kinds of formal, unilateral donor-nation action. First, the 
Kasten-type appropriations situation where specific directions are 
given to a country's Executive Director on the Bank board to cast 
votes or to refrain from voting on particular issues in particular 
ways. Second is the further troubling possibility of direct economic 
threats - the threat of withdrawal of funding for the World Bank 
- tied to conditions of Bank action or inaction on particular loans 
and particular issues. The second category of pressure, moreover, 
may be further separated into threats designed merely to withhold 
extensions or commitments for further funding for the Bank, or a 
more drastic form of statutory condition cutting off appropriations 
for previously agreed-upon funding commitments meeting existing 
Bank quota obligations. 
There is a spectrum of arguments that may be applied to both 
these categories of unilateral donor pressure on an MDB. At one 
end of the spectrum is the opinion of those members of Congress 
who have attached or attempted to attach policy conditions to ap-
propriations bills. As the office of Senator Kasten has indicated,60 
it is always the right of a sovereign people to determine how their 
taxpayer dollars are going to be spent; so if the legislature attaches 
directive conditions to its funding bills, or threatens a cut-off of 
their taxpayers' contributions based on particular policy positions, 
that is no more than one would expect and demand as a right of a 
democratic people. The office of Senator Steven Symms of Idaho 
strongly echoed the same position.61 If World Bank loans in the 
agricultural and mining sector create Third World competitors for 
Idaho farmers and mining corporations, it is perfectly appropriate 
60 Telephone interview with office of Sen. Robert Kasten, Jan. 4, 1988. 
61 Telephone interview with office of Sen. Steven Symms, Nov. 4, 1988. 
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for a member of Congress to attempt to limit the effects of World 
Bank-financed competition through appropriations riders. 62 
Senator Symms has, as recently as the Foreign Aid Appropri-
ations Act for fiscal 1989, prepared amendments that stopped short 
of a retroactive cut-off of committed funds. 63 One provided that if 
a loan designed to produce debt service revenue were approved by 
the Bank over the dissent of the American representative, then the 
future V.S. commitments of funds to the Bank would be reduced 
proportionately. No such amendments, however, have passed the 
Congress. The Treasury Department, which instructs the V.S. 'MDB 
representatives, has announced that it views such amendments as 
violations of international legal commitments and hinted strongly 
that the agency would argue for a veto in such a case; for its part 
the World Bank has made it clear that it would not accept any grant 
of funds from a member state if such conditions were attached. 64 
At the other end of the spectrum is the quite skeptical position 
taken by Dr. Ibrahim Shihata, Vice-President and General Counsel 
of the World Bank. In his speech to the International Third World 
Legal Studies Association in Miami65 and in memoranda prepared 
within the Bank in other similar controversies, Dr. Shihata has 
eloquently argued that all such unilateral threats or suasions applied 
by donor-nations are improper and even contra legem under inter-
national agreements, unless the policy conditions are directly related 
to the economic integrity of the Bank and its loans to member 
states. His position is grounded upon an understandable aversion 
to any politicization of the Bank and other MDBs, that might draw 
them like any other international player into the hurly burly of 
world politics and factionalism. Going back to cases arising in the 
62 The terms of such conditions, of course, cannot appropriately be cast as specific 
domestic protection, but such more or less latent objectives may be the actual motivation of 
restrictions cast in other terms. 
63 See amendment to the foreign aid appropriations bill for fiscal 1989, adopted on the 
Senate floor, July 7, 1987, 133 CONGo REC. S9270, and debate thereupon (subsequently 
removed from the statute as passed). 
The Congressional offices, supra notes 60 and 61, make the further point that, since 
Bank loans are based on borrowing from commercial banks, not merely upon appropriations 
granted by member states represented on the board, the withdrawal of appropriated funds, 
even after a prior agreement to contribute has been made, does not directly undercut the 
Bank's lending program: "At the most it might cause the bond rating of the Bank to drop," 
requiring higher interest rates, but lending could continue. 
64 Interview with policy-level Bank staffer, January 4, 1988. 
65 A conference in conjunction with the AALS Annual Meeting in Miami beach on 
January 8, 1988. See I.F.1. Shihata, The World Bank and Human Rights: An Analysis of the Legal 
Issues and Record of Achievements, 17 DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'y 39 (1989). 
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early 1970's and earlier, Dr. Shihata argued that both Article IV, 
section 10 and Article V, section 5(c) of the Bank's charter prohibit 
direct interference in Bank affairs by member states. Article V 
provides that: 
[T]he President, officers and staff of the Bank in the discharge 
of their offices, owe their duty to the Bank and to no other 
authority. Each member of the Bank shall respect the interna-
tional character of this duty and shall refrain from all attempts 
to influence any [officers] in the discharge of their duties. 
Article IV adds that, in the deliberation of the Bank and its 
officers: 
[O]nly economic considerations shall be relevant to their deci-
sions, and these considerations shall be weighed impartially in 
order to achieve the purposes stated in Article I [setting forth 
the productive development mandate of the World Bank]. 
These conclusions, Dr. Shihata said, "clearly indicate that, as a gen-
eral principle, the Bank, including its Executive Directors, may not 
take into account political considerations."66 Based on the cited 
Articles, Dr. Shihata concluded in a formal memorandum to the 
Bank's Board that "member [states] of the Bank are under an 
obligation not to influence the Bank's President and staff in the 
discharge of their duties, and Executive Directors are under the 
duty not to act as the instrumentality of member [states] to exert 
such prohibited influence." Dr. Shihata also, however, "recognized 
that there was no legal sanction available to challenge a vote by an 
Executive Director which is motivated by political considerations."67 
A fundamental proposition of Dr. Shihata's argument is that 
constraints like environmental or human rights accounting are "po-
litical." He specifically recognized that in some circumstances "there 
are political situations which have effects on the country's economy 
or on the feasibility of project implementation or monitoring which 
should be taken into account."68 Insofar as there can be established 
a link, direct or indirect, between the environmental consequences 
of a loan and the ability of the nation to repay it, that kind of 
economic nexus would justify such "political" intervention. As a 
66Id. 
67 Prohibitions of political activities under the IBRD Articles of Agreement and its 
relevance to the work of the Executive Directors, Sect. M87-1409 (December 23, 1987), 
(unpublished World Bank document) [hereinafter World Bank document]; reproduced in 
Shihata, supra note 65. 
68 World Bank document, supra note 67, at 12-17 (emphasis added). 
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general proposition, however, Dr. Shihata's argument stakes out a 
strong presumptive position against the supposed propriety and 
legality of such "political" interference by any member state in the 
activities of the Board of Directors.69 
Dr. Shihata's position is echoed by the foreign investment com-
mittee of the American Branch of the International Law Associa-
tion, which recently released a report strongly condemning efforts 
by member states of international agreements, specifically the 
United States as a member of the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA), attaching statutory conditions to participatory ac-
tivities under the MIGA international convention. 
The Committee believes that such a unilateral directive to a 
unilateral economic institution ... will be unacceptable to the 
other parties to the Convention. They will question the right of 
one nation to dictate to the Agency that the nation's [interests] 
must be protected ... at the expense of other signatory nations. 
If these conditions are required, U.S. participation in this mul-
tilateral Agency will be barred [sic] and [the Convention] would 
effectively be destroyed. 70 
Somewhere in the middle between the two polar posItIOns is 
the opinion of several MDB legal counselors who informally ex-
pressed a fundamental pragmatism about such donor-nation pres-
sures on international lending. A "whole host of appropriations 
riders" has been attached to recent U.S. funding statutes. According 
to one informal World Bank source, the Bank has implicitly taken 
the position that such pressure is appropriate since it involves guid-
ance to a national representative by its member state. Critical to the 
middle position is a modification of the fundamental distinction 
made by Dr. Shihata. If indeed the Bank's Executive Directors are 
legally to be regarded not as representatives of their appointive or 
elective member states, but rather as individuals deriving their au-
thority from and owing their paramount loyalty and duty to the 
69 This is apparently a position which the Brazilian government agrees with. Brazil, 
concerned with its ability to generate power as it becomes increasingly industrialized, has 
proposed building 136 new dams, among which 70 are in the Amazon Basin. This plan exists 
despite growing environmental concerns expressed from both within Brazil and outside on 
the detrimental effects such damming will have on the existence of the rainforests and the 
world's climate. Brazil believes that hydroelectric power is the cheapest and best way to 
provide energy, and the country's energy concerns outweigh any environmental concerns 
expressed by other nations. See Simons, The American Forest, Brazil Wants Its Dams, but 
At What Cost? N.Y. Times, The Week in Review, Sunday March 12, 1989 § 4.1. 
'II Report by Committee on Foreign Investment, American Branch, International Law 
Association (October 15, 1987) (chaired by David G. Gill, Esq.). 
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Bank, as Dr. Shihata argues, then political pressure upon them is 
improper (and the scope of permissible "economic-linked" political 
pressure is concomitantly narrowed). The pressures of a particular 
national special interest undercut the required dominance of the 
collective international enterprise. 
If, on the other hand, one regards and accepts the status of 
Executive Directors as delegates, representing the position of the state 
or states that put them on the Board, then many instances of donor-
nation pressure upon MDBs become less troublesome, less destruc-
tive of the international agreement underlying the MDB process. 
Such a recognition de-escalates the latent tension represented by 
the alleged "violation" of international agreement, in effect thereby 
rationalizing reality. 
Indeed, political reality indicates that some unilateral pressure 
on MDBs is completely inevitable and will take place regardless of 
whether or not it is formal or informal, direct or indirect, linked to 
economic concerns or not. The initial choice of an Executive Direc-
tor of course is guided to some degree by the character and political 
predilections of the appointee, and to consider that political com-
munication in this modern age would be limited only to discussions 
prior to appointment ignores modern international political reality. 
From this middle perspective, the application of pressure to the 
appointees of member states, or to the elected representatives of 
blocks of member states, is perhaps best regarded with a shrug. In 
any event, the compromise position would note, the directives are 
not an attempt to bind the MDB organization as such. 
According to the middle position, then, the only case where 
donor-nation political interference with lending decisions becomes 
contra legem is the case where the prior commitment of a member 
state to contribute a specified amount of money is unilaterally re-
scinded in whole or in part according to various political conditions. 
In this case a prior binding international agreement is being uni-
laterally abrogated. In other situations, including conditional refus-
als to commit further supplementary contributions, a member state 
is merely exercising its right to contract or to decline to contract. 
An example of the latter phenomenon occurred when the U.S. 
Congress passed Public Law 98-181, in November 1983, with in-
structions to Executive Directors to refrain completely from voting 
unless the representatives had consulted with and received approval 
from appropriate Senate committees. Even this kind of stringent 
condition was arguably proper because it was attached to a resolu-
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tion agreeing to increase the quota for contribution to the Bank, a 
financial undertaking that had not been previously agreed to. 71 
Consent once given is binding, however, and unilateral with-
drawals or rescissions are not appropriate after a commitment has 
been made. Short of that action, however, unilateral pressure is as 
pragmatically acceptable as it is inevitable.72 The whole world is 
political; the whole world is economic;73 therefore it is unrealistic 
to expect political pressure not to occur, and ultimately possible to 
argue that most political intervention can be found to be, at least 
indirectly, linked to concerns about the "economic" ability of the 
debtor nation to repay a development loan. 
From this pragmatic middle perspective, the further forms of 
hortatory donor-nation environmental pressure that have been ap-
plied to MDBs by Canada, West Germany, the Scandinavian states 
and others, are not at all inappropriate. The World Bank is a major 
actor in the Third World, created and funded primarily by devel-
oped Western nations. What happens ecologically, economically, 
and socio-politically in the Third World inevitably affects the world 
order and the varied interests of the developed states. Once one 
concedes that the MDBs are not cocoon-like neutral technical enti-
ties, existing in a sector of economic activity somehow divorced from 
historical and political realities, then the arguments of donor-states 
attempting to persuade MDB boards on various policy issues can 
be seen as part of the stream of information and dialogue that 
constantly and properly flows between players in the international 
order. Bankers are instruments of international development policy, 
not a priesthood. 
71 This is not to say that states' refusal to continue funding ongoing international pro-
grams does not raise important questions of collective support for doctrines of internation-
alism. An example is the debate that followed the U.S. withdrawal from funding for 
UNESCO. See The United States' Withdrawal From UNESCO, 24 INT'L LEGAL MATERIALS 489-
530 (March 1985); Jordan, Boycott Diplomacy: the U.S., the u.N., and UNESCO, 44 PUBLIC 
ADMIN. REV. 283 (1984); Keltz, International Ethical Obligations: the Implications of the U.S. 
Withdrawal From UNESCO, I NOTRE DAME]. L. ETHICS & PUB. POLICY 365 (1985). 
72 For a more thorough analysis of the pressures involved in the loan voting process, see 
generally J. GOLD, VOTING AND DECISIONS IN THE IMF, 87-93, 99-102, 211-12 (1972);]. 
Gold, ThelMF,July 1984]. Bus. L. 308, 315-19 (1984). 
73 Even in the case of the Chilean loans, in which the United States government has 
required its representatives to dissent from development loans so long as the regime violated 
human rights norms, World Bank staffers generally stake a noncommittal position, refusing 
to condemn this stance as a violation of international law or internal Bank Articles. This may 
reflect an implicit interpretation of U.S. pressures as linked to "economic" matters, or a more 
straightforward recognition of the fact that major states' representatives will reflect national 
political considerations and there is nothing that the Bank can do about it. 
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Ultimately then, the most problematic legal controversy is pre-
sented not merely by the application of political pressure to Bank 
lending decisions, but by the drastic potential case of unilateral 
rescission of prior existing commitments to the Bank. Even in such 
cases, it is true, the Bank has no enforcement mechanism and it is 
questionable to what extent it would seek formal legal redress. As 
so often in international law, the resolution of such controversies 
would come down to a very basic question of internationalism. If 
the political actor deems domestic political and legal considerations 
to be dominant over international commitments, then there is no 
effective constraint except the burden of world opinion, both of 
member states and of the international legal profession. 74 Most 
states, however, have clearly accepted the doctrines of internation-
alism in their concept of law. Absent radical domestic political 
changes, it would appear that doctrines of state sovereignty will not 
usually be applied casually to abrogate international development 
commitments. 
V. SUMMARY 
From the foregoing discussion it can be asserted that the ex-
ample of international development loans for construction of large 
dam projects, especially in tropical areas of the Third World, pres-
ents a wide range of troubling consequences that have often been 
systematically and disastrously excluded from prior planning efforts 
and MDB lending procedures. The failure of the international 
development loan process to review and understand the many se-
rious diseconomies caused by such dam projects is attributable at 
least in part to completely understandable internal institutional dy-
namics. An institution that is geared towards large capital-intensive 
projects may find it dysfunctional and motivationally unattractive 
to consider reasons for such projects not to be built. 
74 The dangers inherent in the actions of any nation that simultaneously urges collective 
adherence to international legal norms, and selectively asserts its own sovereign right to 
avoid such responsibilities, is disturbingly evident in the Nicaragua harbor mining case and 
its aftermath. See The United States Withdrawal From the General Compulsory Jurisdiction of the 
International Court of Justice, IC] REV. 39-46 (June 1986); Cole, The World Court Withdrawal: 
an Embarrassing Inconsistency?, 8 The National Law Journal, Nov. 18, 1985, p. 13, col. I.; 
Chayes, Nicaragua, the United States, and the World Court, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1445 (1985) 
(Professor Chayes was counsel to Nicaragua in the ICJ proceedings); Pax, Nicaragua versus 
United States in the International Court of Justice: Compulsory Jurisdiction or Just Compulsion?, 8 
B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 471 (1985); Lieverman, Law and Power: Some Reflections on 
Nicaragua, the United States and the World Court, 10 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 295 (1986). 
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The environmental movement has applied much political pres-
sure upon MDBs over the past decade, largely without success until 
the mid-1980's, attempting to reform the lending process that has 
produced a series of disasters in international water development. 
In the last two years the World Bank and other MDBs have made 
major procedural reforms within their internal processes designed 
to address the problem of environmental diseconomies in their 
projects. To outward appearances, this major change of heart on 
the part of the MDBs can be attributed in at least significant part 
to the pressure applied by donor-nations, including direct unilateral 
mandates to directors requiring environmental reviews and stan-
dards in the MDB lending process, with the implicit potential for 
funding threats in the future. 
The external pressure of donor-nations presents a tangible and 
persuasive catalyst to the internal reform of MDB institutions. Such 
pressure, however, raises some questions about the propriety and 
even legality of the phenomenon, irrespective of the arguably sal-
utary changes it may work in the implementation of international 
lending. From the perspective of jurists sensitive to the development 
of international legal norms, it is at least troubling that such a 
phenomenon has no inherent limits. In the short run, environmen-
tal observers will say that important sets of environmental consid-
erations are now being considered where before they might never 
have been. The health of the planet may thus continue to benefit 
from the efforts of the 1980's. Debate about the proper relationship 
between MDBs and individual donor-states is likewise likely to con-
tinue into the future. 

